Recognition could undermine credibility of its propagated neutralist tendencies without any conceivable compensation. A similar motif also sanctioned, at least partly, a lukewarm Norwegian response to Germany’s offer of a non-aggression pact in April 1939. 81 By contrast, Switzerland, a traditional neutral, did not ponder these issues for long, its Federal Council deciding on 14 April 1939 to acknowledge the reception of the Slovak missive of 15 March without considering it an act of formal recognition; Bratislava nonetheless understood it as a de facto recognition.
22By contrast, on the Norwegian side, the Slovak issue was obscured and forgotten. Whereas Lie and his associates were by no means proponents of small power coalitions within the United Nations alliance, they entertained a relatively close and productive relationship with the exiled Czechoslovaks; there was no point in marring it. Hence, Koht’s puzzle needed investigation.
Koht added that when Norway was entering into relations with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile under Edvard Beneš’ leadership in mid-1940, it had not ipso facto withdrawn recognition of independent Slovakia. He profoundly differentiated ‘Czechoslovak’ from ‘Czech’, although the latter covers both meanings in Norwegian – as in English. In doing so, he dismissed the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation propagated by Beneš and his associates, who had already succeeded in making the Allies renounce the Munich Agreement and accept the premise of Czechoslovakia’s uninterrupted continuity with pre-September 1938 borders as a corollary and conditio sine qua non. 18Although Koht was in fact referring to contacts with Czechoslovak exiles in late summer 1940, no record of them exists in Norwegian Foreign Ministry files, so they were, by contrast to Koht’s routine, undocumented and unknown to Ministry officials.
As an example of ‘ideographic politics’, it still contained a controversial charge in times when the Norwegian and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile were reciprocally recognising themselves as sovereign and allied. That Koht’s claim was investigated swiftly suggests that the Norwegian policy-makers in wartime exile were unwilling to risk possible accusations of disregard of even a minor partner, something likely to disrupt the sought-after harmony within the United Nations coalition. Neutral or Allied, reading the signs of the times was equally important. 1.
A new question emerged, ‘Who should we send the [consular] diploma to? To consul Murín, to the Berlin legation, or to the Slovak foreign minister? ’ Still much was unclear about Slovakia’s international position. Thus, Koht declined to grant recognition. 40 Very little seemed to have changed since March. In the late 1930s, Nordic foreign minister conferences, and those of prime ministers, constituted a platform for consultations. It was customary to initiate a meeting in preparation for annual sessions of the League of Nations Assembly and quarterly meetings of the League Council to facilitate joint positions on pending international issues. With the European crisis of 1938–1939 rich in twists and turns, such meetings became more frequent41; and the Slovak question made an appearance at the foreign ministers’ conference in Oslo on 30–31 August 1939. Sweden’s Rickard Sandler first raised the point, tying the decision to grant a de facto recognition with commercial interests.
The question was no longer whether Norway should ask for an exequatur, but who was to be charged with representing Norway’s interests once Slovakia was granted a de facto recognition. The problem was practical: Murín did not reside in the capital. 59 Nonetheless, Ministry officials had a positive view of him and, as it turned out, he had a helper in his father-in-law, a Bratislava barrister. The decision was made to ask for an exequatur for Murín. By 5 April, a draft letter of credence stipulated that official relations between Norway and Slovakia were thereby established. 60 The Foreign Ministry Political Department eventually chose to apply the procedure contemplated in August 1939 – the Swedish solution.
Koht [Washington] to Foreign Ministry, 13 December 1943, UD [Utenriksdepartementet, Riksarkivet, Oslo] 1940–1949, 34. 20, J. No. 28414/43, Box 11031. All translations are mine. For Slovakia’s history as a state, see Katarína Hradská et al., Slovensko v 20. storočí, Volume IV: Slovenská republika 1939–1945 (Bratislava, 2015); James M. Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca, NY, 2013), 202–57.
A recent Czech study of the (dis)continuity of the Czechoslovak foreign policy administration between March 1939 and May 1945 argues that the answer in 1939 was affirmative. 2 Conversely, a Slovak diplomat-turned-historian does not mention Norway in this respect. 3 This absence merits attention, for recognition was a vital element of post-war exile narratives intended to legitimise the defunct state by presenting it as a full member of the international society not an Axis-installed quasi-state. Finally, a thorough account of Slovakia’s foreign relations does not refer to Norway, save for Slovak intentions to establish bilateral relations. 4 Did Norway grant recognition to Slovakia? Or did even Koht’s trained memory of a historian fail to handle information overload under emergency? Presiding over Norway’s foreign affairs amidst international turmoil, he had to cope with immense physical and psychological strain, possibly further aggravated by his age.
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However, he resolutely dismissed the suggestion that the German minister to Norway be included in this conversation. In doing so, he explicitly wished to forestall the impression of diplomatic negotiations. 71Noack’s proposal was part of the activities of a group around the primate of the Church of Norway, Eivind Berggrav. 72 Albeit reportedly critical of appeasement, 73 the bishop was appealing to the belligerents from the very outbreak of hostilities. As a friend of the crown prince, he invested his hopes in the possibility of a concerted initiative of European royals. 74 Endowed with close contacts in the highest ecclesiastical circles in Germany and Britain, Berggrav sought a road to mediation or, at least, an information exchange about the conditions of peace.
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Ditleff cabled the Foreign Ministry that Poland had instantly granted recognition to the new state. Later, he supplied details: de jure recognition and a chargé d’affaires sent to Bratislava. 25 By that time, a letter of notification was probably on its way to announce the composition of the government and ask for recognition on its behalf. Despatched simultaneously to 51 foreign ministries worldwide and the League of Nations Secretariat, this missive reached Oslo on 20 March.
Whilst this exchange ended, 42 it indicated that Koht had changed his mind about Slovakia and was ready to go further than his Nordic counterparts. A few hours after the Oslo summit, Nazi Germany attacked Poland, with Slovakia participating by its armed forces supporting the Wehrmacht’s southern flank. 43 Norway focused on its security and position and, on 1 and 3 September, issued neutrality declarations. 44 Obviously, there was no time for practical measures vis-à-vis Slovakia. On 7 November, the Norwegian minister to Denmark asked about Oslo’s position on the issue.
46 As no Norwegian reaction was forthcoming, another request followed on 21 November. 47 Koht’s reasons for silence are unknown, but on 23 November, the Foreign Ministry Political Department recommended de iure recognition following notifications to the governments interested in the matter, that is, those of Belgium, Finland, and Sweden – Denmark was not mentioned.
On 7 August, an official of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s Political Department favoured the Swedish solution as Slovak authorities no longer acknowledged Murín’s exequatur as valid and there was no one to represent Norway’s interests. This opinion soon gained support within the Department. It appears that even Ditleff considered the consulate issue acute.
It now seemed opportune to grant recognition in exchange for the prospects of conflict-free commercial relations. Cost-effectiveness dictated Norway processing Slovakia’s application: ‘Recognition, like anything else, can be a commodity’. 84Yet, Norway’s recognition of Slovakia was most probably not formalised. Despite the claim to the contrary based on feeble documentation, no substantive empirical evidence indicating the opposite so far exists. Ironically, at the time when the Foreign Ministry viewed Central Europe as rather stable, it failed to assess appropriately strategic developments close to home.
But on 30 August, he discussed the Norwegian–Czechoslovak relationship, including the Slovak issue, with a confident of Beneš, Hubert Ripka. 19 On 9 September, he pointed out to the designated Czechoslovak representative to Norway, Ladislav Szathmáry, that Norway’s recognition of Slovakia might be open for reconsideration after the war. Koht also declared that Norway was obliged to respect another small nation’s free decision about its future.
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